Government's landslide, nonetheless represented 'the only organised body of opinion outside the National Government, and which will therefore be called on some day, presumably, to form an alternative government.' 16 Accordingly, he began to proffer advice, suggesting, with perhaps an excess of subtlety, that Labour should seek new notions of what was meant by 'economically sound', as well as venturing rather more down-to-earth constructive criticism of its new programme. 17 Although still prevented from joining the party by what he saw as, on the one hand, the timidity of Labour's leaders, and, on the other, the extremism of their followers, in the General Election of 1935 he supported Labour. 18 But this hardly amounted to a full-scale rapprochement.
The Labour Party, too, kept its distance. The upheaval of 1931 led it to adopt policies of physical planning based on nationalisation which were in many respects antithetical to Keynes's conceptions of economic management. The How to Pay for the War controversy would in time give stark illustration of this disparity. Thus although, during the thirties, young Labour economists such as Hugh Gaitskell, Douglas Jay and James Meade took an enthusiastic interest in Keynes's ideas, this had no significant impact upon the party's official programme, even after the publication of the General Theory. Expansionary policies, where mentioned at all, remained a mere lubricant which might serve to smooth the transition to an overwhelmingly physically planned 'socialist commonwealth'. 19 The ideological gap, however, is not the sole explanation for Labour's failure to adopt the policies that Keynes would have wished. The economist's personality proved a stumbling block to warmer relations with the Labour Movement. In the early thirties he enlisted the support of Francis Williams, City Editor of the Daily Herald and a member of Labour's 'XYZ' group of financial experts, in order to help persuade the party of his ideas: 'but not to much avail. Whenever Keynes actually met Labour or trade-union leaders he managed to insult them.' 20 In particular, relations with his former pupil Hugh Dalton, the man with perhaps the greatest influence over Labour's economic programme, were always cool. 21 Furthermore, as Moggridge notes, Keynes' 1930s appointments diaries 'are singularly free of entries suggesting meetings with the emerging generation of senior Labour politicians.' 22 Of course, in the latter part of the decade, illness led to enforced inactivity; he had to restrict his engagements, especially those outside Cambridge, in 1937 declining an invitation to lecture to the Fabian Society for this reason. 23 But it is almost as though, having reached his famous conclusion to the General Theory that 'it is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for good and evil', 24 he was content to sit back and let his ideas do their own 'dangerous' work. This attitude of benevolent neglect kept him out of the Labour Movement's political backrooms in pre-war days, in stark contrast to his later attitude in 1939-40. Then, as a vigorous advocate of his own war-finance plan, he was not afraid to dirty his hands: he would be prepared to court the 'vested interests' in the Labour Party and the unions, and would be prepared to alter his ideas substantially if so doing would secure their acceptance.
The Times articles
Keynes first turned his mind to the twin problems of war-finance and inflation in
October 1939, giving a lecture on the subject to the Marshall Society in Cambridge on the 20th of that month under the title 'War Potential and War Finance'. 25 His strategy for gaining the proposals' acceptance was not to appeal to public opinion directly, but to persuade representative political leaders of their virtue. 26 He thus sent a long memorandum encapsulating the ideas in his lecture to a number of eminent persons including Chancellor of the Exchequer John Simon and Labour Party leader Clement Attlee: it was entitled 'The Limitation of Purchasing Power: High Prices, Taxation and Compulsory Savings'. He subsequently divided the memorandum in two, and wrote in a little extra length to make it suitable for publication in The Times on consecutive 6 days; he also omitted the original suggestion that the purchasing power of the proposed compulsory savings should be guaranteed on the grounds that it would distract discussion from the main plan.
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As published, on 14 and 15 November, under the title 'Paying For The War', the articles highlighted the need to restrain working-class consumption during war-time in order to avoid inflation:
Nothing is more certain that the wages bill of this country will increase...Thus the working classes will have a substantially larger money income than before, but they must not, at the best, consume any more than they did. For the wise and just solution of this problem the leaders of the working class must be taken into earnest and sincere consultation.
Keynes dismissed both rationing and anti-profiteering measures as 'pseudo-remedies'.
The former, against a backdrop of a general increase in purchasing power, would simply divert demand from the rationed to the unrationed article, and ignored differing consumer preferences; the latter 'exalts into undue prominence the least significant cause of rising prices.' He therefore turned to what he saw as the three genuine ways of restoring equilibrium between supply and demand. The first was inflation. To some extent this was both inevitable and desirable, but to rely on it alone would be to invite a 'vicious spiral' of prices and wages. The second remedy was taxation. Yet, not only was it impossible to finance the war entirely out of current taxation without borrowing, 'But to help solve our present problem it must involve taxation of the working classes' as it was they who did three-fifths of the nation's consuming, and it was their incomes which were expected to rise. Thus, 'The price remedy and the taxation remedy are alike in depriving the working class of any benefit from their increased earnings. Yet a large portion of the earnings now in question represents increased effort on their part.' But if it were physically impossible for the community at war to reward this increased effort by immediate consumption -and if immediate consumption might in fact have to be reduced -there was no reason why it should not 7 be rewarded by a claim on future resources. This 'deferred payment' was Keynes' third, and preferred, remedy.
The detail of his plan was that a percentage of all incomes in excess of a stipulated minimum income would be paid over to the Government, partly as compulsory savings and partly as direct taxes, on a steeply graduated scale. Some of this amount would be credited to the individual in the Post Office Savings Bank, the balance being used to discharge his or her tax liabilities, if any. The sums thus credited would carry two-and-a-half per cent interest, and would be blocked for most purposes. They would be unblocked and made freely available to the holder, probably by a series of instalments, at some date after the war, thus helping the country through the 
Labour reacts
From the outset, Keynes had attached much importance to the acquiescence of the The two men were friendly; but Pethick-Lawrence now wrote a long article attacking the notion of compulsory saving, which appeared in the socialist weekly Forward on 25 November. He agreed with Keynes that the war necessitated much abstinence from non-essential expenditure, but at present there area million-and-a-half people unemployed, and it is unsound economy to forego expenditure, with the result that more people are thrown out of work until the tide of war expenditure has risen and is ready to absorb them.
Moreover, the enormous variation in individual circumstances meant that voluntary rather than compulsory saving was desirable, if the latter could possibly be avoided:
this trust in good sense and patriotism was 'in accordance with the genius of our people', upon whom it was unnecessary to impose 'a rigid scale of forced loans.' And finally, 'statesmen and economists cannot expect the workers to make new and unprecedented sacrifices until they are prepared to impose a special tax on capital wealth.' 42 He also sent these views to Keynes direct, after receiving an initial letter from the economist advocating his scheme and conveying disappointment at Greenwood's article. 43 In peacetime Keynes would have naturally concurred with Pethick-Lawrence's sentiment that it was wrong to try to deflate the economy in conditions short of full employment. But the situation had now altered fundamentally, or was about to.
Keynes had, in a third Times article responding to his critics (published on 28 November), pointed out that heavy government expenditure combined with largescale unemployment was a situation that could not long persist. 44 This he also pointed out to Pethick-Lawrence directly in the first part of December. Moreover, he insisted that his plan was flexible, and asked for input from Labour:
The more I think about it, the more convinced I am that something of the kind I suggest is required by the interests of the working class. But, of course, it is capable of all sorts of variants, and can be protected by many safe-guards. I wish you and your colleagues would prepare your own plan, absorbing so much of mine as you find serviceable. 45 He had some grounds for optimism on this score, in that Pethick-Lawrence was trying to arrange for him to meet the Labour Party Front Bench early in the New Year. 46 But, more ominously, Ernest Bevin now seemed to set his face against the scheme.
As the leader of Britain's largest union, Bevin was both highly influential within the My time has been taken up in trying to get wages commensurate with the cost of living. I am determined to try to keep them up to a proper level. The powers that be have won in the first round but that is only a temporary victory for them. As our people sicken of this business they will revolt against the depression of their standards.
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When Chamberlain, in his Mansion House speech of 9 January 1940, argued that it would be a mistake to tie wages to the cost of living, 48 Bevin reacted angrily. 'The policy of the Government as I see it,' he told the Daily Herald, 'is to talk about sacrifices by people who had nothing to sacrifice when the war started.'
Of those wage-earners to whom Mr. Chamberlain talks of sacrifice, 90 per cent. were on wage standards that left no margin. This was, to say the least, a radical suggestion, which duly took its place in How to
Pay for the War. The General Theory; had famously advocated 'the euthanasia of the rentier'; its author now advanced a practical proposal for achieving that end. Keynes was thus both genuinely passionate for social reform and willing to emphasise the 'socialist' aspect of his thought in order to accommodate Labour and trade union opinion.
The second divergence was on the question of rationing, something he hadn't put on paper 'because it was of necessity controversial, and not of the essence of the scheme':
There was a good case for sugar and butter rationing but when they got to general rationing its result would be to destroy consumer's [sic] choice.
It had been said you had either to tighten up the pocket or the pantry...He was all for the pocket and not the pantry...Once they had constricted the pocket they were coming on to the moment when they could have a Government scheme.
Keynes said such a scheme should consist of a narrow list including necessities made into Woodcock further believed that the 'moral influence' of the trade union movement in persuading people to save voluntarily should not be underestimated, but also wondered whether Keynes' scheme should not be made more stringent. 82 The distinguished visitor was much impressed. 83 Finally, Keynes made a suggestion:
the memo. which he had circulated was just an extract from the pamphlet which he was writing, and which he would finish in about ten days. He was willing to hold up publication of that until the [General] Council had discussed the matter, and if they felt and were satisfied to work for anything on that line, he would be content to abandon the field rather than butt in on his own. He would much rather hand over to them the results of his thinking up to date, or assist in any way, rather than put it as an individual. He had no pride in authorship.
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Although the TUC 'deeply appreciated the extreme generosity of your offer' they nonetheless refused it; 85 that it was made at all was yet another indication of Keynes' willingness at this time not only to be flexible in his ideas, but to do everything he could in order to see them accepted by the Labour Movement. His campaign now continued accordingly.
Keynes meets the Fabian Society
By the time that Keynes addressed the Fabian Society at London's Royal Hotel at lunchtime on 21 February, his new booklet was ready, and proof copies were being received by those he sought to convert. 86 preference important so long as there was great poverty. A dictatorship of consumption was desirable.' 89 The emergency of war made it doubly so; the 'pseudoremedy' of widespread rationing was supported by most socialists as representing 'fair shares' or 'equality of sacrifice'. Keynes's strictures against the shortages this would produce underestimated not only the British genius for queuing, but also the extent to which Labour had a genuine preference for direct physical controls as opposed to more subtle methods of macroeconomic management. Yet in spite of this underlying philosophical difference, the Fabian lunch was a success, Keynes having 'a pretty strong impression that at least a majority were persuaded' and the word in Labour circles being positive. 90 And on 27 February the book itself was published.
How to Pay for the War
Upon its launch, Keynes continued his vigorous propaganda campaign. He outlined his proposals to an all-party group of MPs, and again at the National Trade Union Club; he met the Chancellor and also gave a BBC broadcast. 91 There were also vestiges in Labour circles of the trade unions' traditional opposition to family allowances, on the grounds that employers would use them as an excuse to depress wages, 106 but this had not been raised at Keynes's meeting with the TUC, and the allowances were at any rate inessential to his scheme. The 'iron ration', too, aroused some limited controversy. As Bevan had put it, 'The proposition that steel workers, miners and engineers shall subsist upon this restricted margin of commodities, surrounded by the spectacle of war profiteers being able to buy goods at highly inflated prices, but still able to buy them, will never be accepted by the organised industrialists of this country.' 107 This view was not universal, however.
Another minor point was that Keynes had to spend much energy reiterating his belief that deferred pay should not be taken into consideration under the Means Test. Yet more substantial criticisms were also raised.
Perhaps the most convincing of these was political, not economic. Ellen Wilkinson MP, the originator of the Jarrow March, argued that 'the Keynes Plan was a perfectly sound proposal if considered in vacuo, but that, in practice, it was impossible to consider it except in relation to the social and industrial circumstances in which...it would be carried into effect.' These circumstances consisted of the perceived class antagonism of the Chamberlain government, and the habit of capitalist governments in war-time of making, in exchange for sacrifices, promises to the workers which were subsequently broken. All Keynes's safeguards depended 'on the promise of a Wilkinson had attacked the plan apparently without having read it; most of her criticisms were ill-conceived, and Keynes managed to half-convert her. This was a potentially important coup, as she had by then been co-opted onto the NEC committee dealing with the scheme.
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Another important issue was raised by a member of the secretarial staff of the National Union of Railwaymen, who wrote to Keynes in a private capacity noting that most trade union criticism of the plan was directed on the issue of the security of the savings. 111 Keynes admitted that this objection, also raised by Wilkinson amongst others, was difficult to meet, 'chiefly for the reason that there is so little that is definite behind it.' But the savings would be simply another part of the National Debt: 'There has never been a case of repudiation in this country, and I should have thought that political reasons alone would have made the position of deferred pay quite safe.'
112
There was, of course, a subsidiary point: assuming that the government did repay its debts, when would this happen, and after how much inflation? In this respect the critics were ultimately shown to have had a degree of foresight: when a limited version of Keynes' scheme was in time put into place, the resultant 'post-war credits' depreciated heavily before they were eventually (and tardily) repaid.
By contrast, when Ernest Bevin finally showed his hand, his criticisms of How to Pay for the War were less than brilliant. But the power of ideas is partly a function of the power of the person who has them, and after he declared his opposition to the plan it was unlikely that the rest of the TUC would overrule him, even had they favoured articulate precisely what his objection to compulsory saving was, save for a general distaste for compulsion itself; but his not-so-subtle threat to cause trouble were the scheme implemented would surely have put the government off adopting the plan, even had it been minded to in the first place.
The Labour Party decides
Meanwhile, the Labour Party NEC was determining its official position. This was a convoluted and time-consuming process. In January, the Press, Publicity and
Campaign Sub-Committee, on which Laski served, had recommended a meeting with Keynes; this proposal was then shelved by the Policy Committee, which nonetheless agreed to meet specially to discuss the proposals. This meeting eventually took place on April 4, reached no conclusion, and then reconvened on April 11. 116 Those present included Dalton, Attlee, Douglas Jay, Pethick-Lawrence, Wilkinson and Greenwood.
The committee considered a document drafted by its secretary, G. Grant McKenzie, which analysed the Keynes scheme in detail.
The plan was objected to first on grounds of administrative complexity; moreover, in order to enable deductions to be calculated 'it would require employers to be informed of the whole personal income and circumstances of all their employees', which 'would create grave objection and difficulty.' (This was in the days before PAYE.) It was acknowledged that Keynes had modified his scheme in response to criticism, but it was argued that his modifications left untouched both the problem of evasion by the rich, and the diversity of individual capacity to save. 117 Furthermore, 'the adoption of the scheme would inevitably destroy the bulk of individual voluntary saving'; the likely net yield of genuine saving generated was thus estimated to be only £140 million, much lower than Keynes' aim of £550 million. Assuming this lower estimate 'proved even approximately correct, the scheme would fail of its purpose, and would not in any way justify the upset it would cause', this being presumably a reference to
Bevin's veiled threat of industrial action.
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What, then, were the suggested alternatives? Unsurprisingly, the document focused on increased taxation of middle and higher incomes and war profits, as well as on rationing and the regulation of prices, and on a better organised scheme of voluntary saving: 'If, after these methods have been thoroughly tried, prices are not under control and inflation threatens, only then will it be necessary to consider whether compulsion is necessary and practicable.' 119 There was, however, no mention of an annual capital tax during war-time. This was peculiar, in that such a tax was an important feature of the official policy pamphlet written by Douglas Jay, and of unofficial socialist thought too, 120 although, as Stephen Brooke points out, this idea did not command unanimous support even in socialist spheres, Barbara Wootton in particular abjuring it on grounds of administrative complexity. 121 At any rate, the committee subjected the document only to slight amendment before approving it. It was not, however, to be published, thus leaving a very slight opening for a future reversal in policy; but, to all intents and purposes, Keynes' attempt to make his plan 'outrageously attractive to the Labour Party' had now failed.
A 'sophisticated and successful' campaign?
Therefore, although Moggridge's contention that Keynes' propagandist campaign was sophisticated cannot be doubted, can it really be classed a success? Certainly, the system of deferred pay was eventually incorporated, as 'post-war credit', into the were ultimately judged not to be 'good politics'. At a less cynical level, it is also possible to appreciate Labour leaders' genuine concern for the condition of the workers at a time when wages were already falling behind prices, and when largescale unemployment still remained: compulsory saving could easily be seen as yet one more sacrifice at a difficult time. Furthermore, Keynes believed that a long war was necessary, and that within a reasonably short time it would involve total economic mobilisation. This was not equally clear to everyone. As Bevan told the Commons at the end of April, before the details and repercussions of the Norwegian disaster were known, 'Mr. Keynes himself pointed out that the necessity for his plan does not arise until the nation's resources are fully employed. So long as we have 1,000,000 men and 2,000,000 women who might be employed in an extremity, it does not seem to me that this House is called upon to consider the details of Mr. Keynes's plan.' 132 Thus as long as the war appeared to be 'Phoney', and the economic effort involved half-hearted, it seemed to some Labour thinkers correspondingly less necessary to worry about how to pay for it, especially if the answer involved the painful restraint of working-class consumption.
Together, these various reasons do much to explain why, by April 1940, Keynes had failed to win the Labour Movement's acceptance of his plan. But the truly defining factor was the political situation more generally. For, whilst Chamberlain and Simon, seen by the Labour Movement as representatives of the class war, remained in their respective positions, it was impossible for Keynes to succeed. Even had their government sponsored his plan, Labour would have rejected it; a fact which in turn prevented the government adopting it in the first place. But Churchill's accession to power changed all this. By August, the Labour Party was prepared to examine the issue afresh. 133 By October, Greenwood, of all people, now Minister without Portfolio, was himself advocating forced saving. 134 The following spring, Kingsley Wood's Budget, which included a version of Keynes's scheme, was warmly welcomed by all the main political parties (although the TUC remained opposed to compulsory saving).
Why this change of heart? To begin with, it was clearly now easier for the Labour Movement to accept assurances about the security of deferred pay from a government in which, with Attlee, Greenwood and Bevin in important positions, it was generously represented. Second, as the economy became more fully mobilised, the rapid reduction of unemployment rendered redundant the argument that action against inflation was as yet unnecessary. Furthermore, the Treasury scheme, as put into effect, was on a notably small scale, yielding only £125 million a year: 'It was thus more of an experiment than the centrepiece of war finance', in Moggridge's words. 135 The corollary of this, of course, was that the scheme was merely the junior partner to largescale rationing and profits-limitation exercises -war finance methods that the Labour Movement very much approved. The concession of principle involved, if any, was therefore slight.
Ultimately, the, Keynes' propagandist campaign was not, on its own terms, successful -except to the extent that, if indeed at all, its educative value encouraged voluntary wage restraint by the unions. This was in spite of the campaign's sophistication, and in spite of Keynes's willingness to adjust his ideas in order to get his plan accepted. Walter's view...workers would repudiate leaders who asked them to do this. Moreover, the trade unions had at all times to counter definite opposition designed to discredit
